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PSAF, Economic Capital and the New Basel Accord
by James B. Thomson
The 1980 Monetary Control Act requires the Reserve Banks to recover their costs of
providing payments services over time, including a normal return on capital – that is, the
same after tax return on equity that a private firm would require. To date, this private
sector adjustment factor has been estimated and applied as a single hurdle rate for all
Reserve Bank payments services. Capital budgeting theory suggests that firms should use
a different hurdle rate for each distinct type of activity according to its risks.  For Reserve
Bank payments services, this might entail estimating separate private sector adjustment
factors for paper-based services and for electronic services.  Alternatively, a single hurdle
rate of capital could be used for all services if capital is allocated to each service
according to its risk.
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The 1980 Monetary Control Act changed the competitive environment for
payments services providers.  This landmark legislation sought to level the playing field
between the Federal Reserve Banks and private providers of correspondent banking
services in two ways.  First, it provided all depository institutions with equal access to the
services offered by Federal Reserve Banks.  Second, in the absence of an overriding
social welfare concern, the MCA required the Reserve Banks to recover their costs of
providing payments services over time, including a normal return on capital – that is, the
same after tax return on equity that a private firm would require.
1
As embodied in the Federal Reserve System payments services White Paper, the
historical approach to complying with the MCA has been the construction of the private
sector adjustment factor (PSAF) as a proxy for the differential costs Reserve Banks
would incur if they were truly private providers of correspondent banking services.
2
Properly constructed, the PSAF would improve the economic efficiency of the market for
correspondent banking services by minimizing one of the artificial competitive
advantages associated with the GSE status of Reserve Bank payments services.
3
Unfortunately, there are a number of reasons to believe that the current method
for computing the PSAF results in an estimated cost of capital that is not representative of
the private cost of capital associated with the types of correspondent banking services
provided by the Reserve Banks.
4  As we will discuss later, whether or not the return on
equity for the top 50 bank holding companies (or top 50 financial holding companies)
was ever a valid proxy for the hurdle rate of capital for Federal Reserve payments
services, there is a reasonable presumption that this index is an increasingly poor proxy
for the Fed payment services’ hurdle rate of capital.
5   This is especially true given the
                                                
1 Federal Reserve payments services is one of the few government-sponsored enterprises that Congress has
explicitly sought to negate the competitive advantages associated with GSE status – the other exception is
Sallie Mae who is in the process of full privatization (see Sallie Mae [1996]).
2 See Federal Reserve Board (1984).
3 Reserve Bank Correspondent Banking Services still enjoy a number of competitive advantages from
being housed in the nation’s central bank including access to:  irrevocable payments guarantees, universal
settlement, and universal lender-of-last resort facilities.
4 The cost of equity capital component of the PSAF is computed at the 5 year moving average of the book
equity returns for the top 50 bank holding companies.  A simple description of the PSAF calculation and
some proposed refinements can be found in Green et al. (2001a, 2001b).
5 Issues with respect to the computation of PSAF and proposed reforms are discussed in Green et al.
(2001).3
withdrawal of many large banks from correspondent banking services and the increased
diversity of activities that can be (and are being) conducted under the financial holding
company umbrella raised by the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.
  A separate issue arises in the allocation of capital to different types of payments
services.  Capital budgeting theory suggests that firms should use a different hurdle rate
for each distinct type of activity according to its risks.  In the case of Reserve Bank
correspondent services, this might entail estimating separate PSAFs for paper-based
services and for electronic services.  Alternatively, a single hurdle rate of capital could be
used for all services if capital is allocated to each service according to its risk.  This is the
rationale behind the use of RAROC (risk-adjusted return on capital) in bank lending
decisions and the spirit behind the Federal Reserve’s SR99-18 economic capital directive.
Furthermore, the recently announced Basel capital accords should require the Federal
Reserve to fundamentally rethink its approach for assigning capital to its payments
services.
I.  Impediments to PSAF Reform
Unlike private providers of correspondent banking services, Reserve Bank cost of
capital computations are subject to the approval of their primary regulator – the Federal
Reserve Board – and the scrutiny of politicians. Subjecting the method for computing the
PSAF to public examination and debate is important because, as the nation’s central
bank, the Federal Reserve is not subject to the varieties of market discipline faced by its
private payments system competitors.  While a quasi-private board of directors oversees
the operations of each Federal Reserve Bank’s payments operations, Reserve Banks are
not subject to the market for corporate control. This is due, in part, to the
nontransferability of Federal Reserve Bank stock and to the ability of Reserve Banks to
fund their operations out of the seigniorage revenues earned from issuing the monetary
base.
Unfortunately, conducting PSAF reform in the public arena has been a major
obstacle towards making needed changes to more fully comply with the Board of
Governor’s regulatory implementation of the MCA.  Prior to the passage of the Financial
Modernization Act of 1999 only material changes in the computation of the PSAF were4
subject to the public comment – through the publication of these changes in the Federal
Register for public comment.  This lack of periodic review of the existing method for
computing the PSAF reinforced the inertia of the status quo.
Green et al. (2001b) note that the computation of the PSAF must “Be intelligible
and justifiable to the public, and replicable from information that can be obtained by the
public.” In other words, the public nature of Reserve Banks places the additional burden
of simplicity and understandability on any method adopted to compute the RBCBS’
hurdle rate(s).  While the method adopted to compute the PSAF must be straightforward
and defensible, transparency need not come at the expense of accuracy.  Unfortunately,
the sometimes politically charged atmosphere in which PSAF reforms are made may
result in a level of simplicity in the construction of the PSAF that does not increase its
transparency, but does reduce its usefulness as a proxy for the required private rate of
return on capital for correspondent banking services.  Moreover, misapplication of the
simplicity criteria increases the cost of innovation and hence, biases the process against
the introduction of meaningful reforms.
II.  An Economic Capital Approach to Capital Budgeting
In 1994 Bankers Trust introduced ‘risk adjusted return on capital’ (RAROC).
Under the RAROC approach decisions are made using the firm’s weighted-average cost
of capital as the hurdle rate for investment decisions.  RAROC controls for differences in
risk across projects/investments thorough a decision rule that allocates capital to
projects/investments according to their risk.  For example, a $100 million loan to a AAA-
rated borrower would be allocated less capital than a similar loan to BBB-rated credit.
Ultimately, the decision to make either loan will hinge upon whether the rate of return on
capital exceeds the hurdle rate (cost of capital).
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To illustrate the use of RAROC, consider the following example.  Assume that a
firm is interested in investing for one period and it has three alternative investments (A, B
                                                
6  RAROC = E(Y)/K*, where E(Y) = one period expected income on the investment and K* is the amount
of capital at risk.  We want to take on all investments/projects for which RAROC > RAROC*, where
RAROC* is the bank’s hurdle rate or weighted-average cost of funds (including capital).  Here a period is
effectively the amount of time before investments can be redeployed.5
and C) to consider.  Assume that the firm’s cost of equity capital, RAROC*, is 8.5
percent and it will take on any investment where
E(Y)/K ≥ RAROC* = 0.085.
Here E(Y) is the one-period expected income from the investment and K is the amount of
capital allocated to the investment (that is, E(Y)/K = expected return on equity).
Furthermore, assume the one-period expected income accruing to the firm’s equity
holders on each investment is A ($90), B ($85), and C ($80).  Finally, assume that each
investment will cost $10,000 and that the firm uses its capital-to-asset ratio of 10 percent
to allocate capital to its investments – hence, the capital charge for each investment is
$1000.  Table 1 presents the firm’s investment decision.
Table 1: Capital Allocated by Capital-to-Asset Ratio
Investment ROE Take RAROC* E(Y) K
A 0.0900 Yes 0.085 90 1000
B 0.0850 Yes 0.085 85 1000
C 0.0800 No 0.085 80 1000
Under the simple capital rule, the firm will take on investments A and B.  However, what
the simple capital rule does not account for is that the three investments pose different
risks to the firm.  By construction the investments each carry a different level of risk and
we assume that the law of one price holds – hence, A is the riskiest investment and C is
the safest.  Investment A is riskier than the firm’s current assets.  Investment B carries the
same level of risk as the firm’s current assets.  Finally, the risk of investment C is less
than that of the firm’s assets.  Hence, allocating capital to new investments according to
the firm’s existing capital structure biases the firm towards investments like A (ones
riskier than average for the firm) and away from investments like C (ones less risky than
average for the firm).
Table 2 shows the investment decision under RAROC where capital is allocated
to the alternative investments according to their risk – that is according to the amount of
the firm’s capital that is exposed by the investment.  In table 2, K* corresponds to the
amount of capital at risk for each alternative investment and RAROC is E(Y)/K*.6
Table 2: Capital Allocated by Risk Exposure
Investment RAROC Take RAROC* E(Y) K*
A 0.0833 No 0.085 90 1080.000
B 0.0850 Yes 0.085 85 1000.000
C 0.0870 Yes 0.085 80 920.000
Under the RAROC rule, we would still take on investment B.  However, once risk is
taken into account (under RAROC this is done by adjusting the amount of capital
allocated) the firm would no longer consider investment A but would take on C.  In fact,
investment C adds the most value to the firm because its risk-adjusted return exceeds the
firm’s cost of capital.  By not taking into account risk, the simple investment rule reduces
firm value because its risk-adjusted return is less than the firm’s cost of capital.
Application to Reserve Bank Correspondent Banking Services (RBCBS)
Currently, the Federal Reserve Banks follow the equivalent of the simple capital
allocation rule in the application of PSAF in its pricing decisions.  The Federal Reserve
Board’s White Paper on financial services, the regulatory interpretation and
implementation of the MCA, requires the RBCBS to price its products to cover operating
costs plus PSAF.  While the MCA mandates full cost recovery by RBCBS over the long
run, the Federal Reserve Board mandates the more stringent requirement of full cost
recovery each year for each broad service line.  There are a number of reasons to question
whether the PSAF, as currently computed, properly measures the private cost of capital
for RBCBS.
Electronic payments services and paper-based payments services are unlikely to
have the same risk and hence, even if the PSAF represents the appropriate hurdle rate
(cost of capital) for RBCBS it is unlikely to be the appropriate hurdle rate for either type
of service.  If we assume that the Fed’s check service is less risky than its electronic
services then the appropriate hurdle rate for paper-based services will be less than the
PSAF, and conversely the appropriate hurdle rate for electronic services will be higher
than the PSAF.  However, the purpose of this example is not to show the defects in the
PSAF, but rather how the failure to apply a correctly computed PSAF can lead to
distortions in the pricing of RBCBS individual product lines.7
Assume that the RBCBS has two distinct product lines (check and wire transfer)
over which it must allocate $5 million in capital.  In addition, assume that the check
service accounts for 80 percent of total RBCBS operating costs and that the Reserve
Banks evenly allocate capital on the basis of operating costs.  Finally, assume that in the
private sector electronic payments services have a higher required rate of return on
capital (are riskier) than paper-based payments services.
Table 3: Capital Allocated by Share of Expenses
Service PSAF E(Y)* K
Wire Transfer 0.012 12000 1,000,000
Check 0.012 48000 4,000,000
In table 3, E(Y)*  is the earnings that Wire Transfer and Check must produce (in addition
to their operating costs) to cover a PSAF of 12 percent, given their capital allocation.
Under a RAROC-like economic capital approach, capital would be allocated
according to the riskiness of the activities.  This is illustrated in table 4 where wire
transfer’s economic capital allocation is assumed to be $1.5 million and check’s
economic capital allocation is assumed to be $3.5 million.
Table 4: Capital Allocated by Share of Expenses
Service PSAF E(Y)* K
Wire Transfer 0.012 18000 1,500,000
Check 0.012 42000 3,500,000
Comparing tables 3 and 4 we see that failure to take into account differences in risk in
allocating capital results in Check having to earn an additional $6000 to cover the PSAF
– and results in a cross subsidy of the electronic services by the paper-based ones
  This example focuses on required earnings to illustrate the biases in simple
capital allocation rules on service line prices under a ‘full cost recovery by product line’
mandate.  The extension of this example to examine investment/capital-budgeting
decisions is trivial, a simple replication of the RAROC example in tables 1 and 2 and
hence, won’t be presented here.  However as in the investment example above, the failure
to either charge different hurdle rates for each service (given a non-risk-based capital
allocation) or allocate economic capital according to risk (when a single hurdle rate is8
used) can lead to suboptimal investment/capital budgeting decisions – ones that can
destroy economic value.
Basel II and RBCBS Capital Allocation
In June of 1999 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released the
consultative paper “A New Capital Adequacy Framework.”  This paper was followed by
release of the full proposal for comment in January of 2001.
7  Basel II represents a major
change in the approach to capital regulation, one that has implications for RBCBS.
Under the traditional approach to capital adequacy as embodied in the 1988 Basel Capital
Accords, a bank’s regulatory capital was determined by the broad set of activities it
engaged in.  These activities were assigned to crude risk buckets to determine regulatory
capital. Under the new Basel capital adequacy framework, capital will be assessed
according to the risks a bank undertakes.  Banks – in particular internationally active
institutions or large complex banking organizations – will be required to assign capital
according to three types of risk:  credit risk, market risk, and operations risk.  Banks will
be expected to comply with a fully implemented standard in 2005.
Following the first Basel II consultative paper, the Federal Reserve issued a
supervisory letter on economic capital allocation. Generally referred to as SR 99-18, this
supervisory letter “…directs supervisors and examiners to evaluate internal capital
management processes to judge whether they meaningfully tie the identification,
monitoring, and evaluation of risk to the determination of the institution's capital needs.”
8
In general, SR 99-18 can viewed as part of the shift in capital regulation from activity
based capital adequacy standards towards risk-driven capital standards.
From the perspective of RBCBS, Basel II and SR 99-18 present a new challenge.
Under current interpretation and regulatory implementation of the MCA by the Board of
Governors, RBCBS will need to develop the capability to allocate capital to its services
according to their risks in a manner that is consistent with Basel II and that meets the
                                                
7 Information on the New Basel Capital Accord, including the second consultative package and comments
received, can be found at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm.
8 See Federal Reserve Board (1999).9
standards set out in SR 99-18.
9 Conceptually, economic capital allocation in the spirit of
Basel II and SR 99-18 is the same approach outlined earlier in this section – that is, the
assigning of capital to payments services by their risks.  This is why we advocate this
approach over the multiple-hurdle rate approach for RBCBS pricing and capital
budgeting decisions outlined below.
III.  Different Strokes for Different Folks:  Service Specific PSAFs
  An alternative to adjusting the capital allocation to account for risk is to adjust the
hurdle rate – or rather estimate the cost of capital by service line.
10 Following the
examples in the previous section assume RBCBS has two service lines – wire transfer
and check.  The weighted-average cost of capital (PSAF) has two components, the
private cost of capital for a check clearing service (PSAFCK) and the private cost of capital
for a wire transfer service (PSAFWT).
(1)                                      ) 1 ( WT CK PSAF w wPSAF PSAF − + =
The w in equation (1) is the proportion of total payments services activities accounted for
by the check service line – measured as the proportion of RBCBS costs allocated to
check.  Clearly, the true cost of capital for RBCBS is a function of the private cost of
capital for each service line and their relative weights.  From equation (1) the PSAF will
vary through time as the mix of RBCBS payments services changes – irrespective of
whether the private hurdle rates for check and wire transfer change.
11
Implications for Capital Budgeting
From a capital budgeting perspective, if PSAFCK ≠ PSAFWT then use of PSAF as
the hurdle rate of capital for either service will lead to suboptimal investments.  To
illustrate this, assume that w = 0.8, PSAFCK = 0.1, PSAFWT = 0.15 and PSAF = 0.11.
                                                
9 SR 99-18 outlines what it calls the “the fundamental elements of a sound internal capital adequacy
analysis” which includes “– identifying and measuring all material risks, relating capital to the level of risk,
stating explicit capital adequacy goals with respect to risk, and assessing conformity to the institution's
stated objectives - as well as the key areas of risk to be encompassed by such analysis.”
10 Kane (1999) advocates this approach.
11 Equation (1) also provides intuition on the inadequacy of using the top 50 bank or financial holding
company equity returns to compute the PSAF.   For these large financial companies the cost of capital is
the weighted average of a diverse set of activities whose risks and required returns are unrelated to the
correspondent banking services offered by RBCBS10
Assume that RBCBS has the following projects available to it; each project costs $1000
and has net cash flows C(1) to C(5) over the next five periods.  Under the net present
value (NPV) rule the RBCBS check business should undertake all projects whose NPV ≥
0 and reject all negative NPV projects.
Table 5
Cash Flows
Project Type C(0) C(1) C(2) C(3) C(4) C(5)
A Check -1000 700 300 50 50 50
B Check -1000 100 100 100 600 600
C Check -1000 275 275 275 275 275
D Check -1000 100 150 150 150 1000
E Wire Transfer -1000 100 200 300 400 400
F Wire Transfer -1000 100 100 100 700 700
G Wire Transfer -1000 300 300 300 300 300
H Wire Transfer -1000 900 100 100 100 100
Assume that RBCBS looks at the four check projects in table 5.  Table 6  shows
the results of the capital budgeting decisions for these check projects using the RBCBS
single hurdle rate (PSAF) and the appropriate hurdle rate for check projects.   Using
PSAF as the discount factor (hurdle rate) we reject projects A and B under the net present
value rule.  Using the appropriate hurdle rate to evaluate the projects, project A is still
rejected (NPVA = -12.94).  However, RBCBS would take on project B, which has an
economic value added (EVA) of 31.05.
Table 6: Capital Budgeting in Check
PSAF = 0.11 PSAFCK = 0.10
Project Take NPV Take NPV EVA Lost
A No -26.71 Yes -12.94 0
B No -4.32 Yes 31.05 31.05
C Yes 16.37 Yes 42.47 0
D Yes 13.77 Yes 50.95 0
A second way to examine the distortions in investment decisions is to consider an
alternative investment rule.  Assume that RBCBS can only take on one project and
therefore, its optimal decision rule is to undertake the project with the highest NPV.
Using the correct hurdle rate – PSAFCK – project D would be selected.  However,
employing the single hurdle rate – PSAF – in the decision results in the RBCBS
incorrectly choosing project C over project D – the EVA lost is $8.48.11
Table 7 shows the distortions to the capital budgeting decision when the PSAF is
used as the hurdle rate for projects whose true cost of capital is higher than the average
cost of capital.  Using the PSAF of 11 percent RBCBS would take on projects F, G and
H.  However, using the correct hurdle rate for wire transfer projects – PSAFWT – of 15
percent project F would be rejected because it has a negative NPV ($-23.43).  In other
words, taking on F destroys economic value because it returns less than the cost of
capital.
Table 7: Capital Budgeting in Wire Transfer
PSAF = 0.11 PSAFWT = 0.15
Project Take NPV Take NPV EVA Lost
E No -27.36 No -136.99 0
F Yes 120.90 No -23.43 -23.43
G Yes 108.77 Yes 5.65 0
H Yes 90.31 Yes 30.87 0
  Following the example for check, assume that RBCBS can only select one wire
transfer project.  In this scenario, RBCBS should rank the projects according to their
NPV and select the project with the highest NPV.  When the average cost of capital is
used to compute the NPV, the highest valued project would be F – with an estimated
value of $120.90 and a true value of -$23.43.  On the other hand, when the PSAFWT is
used to compute NPV the highest value project is H.  Hence, economic value is destroyed
by the simple application of PSAF.
Finally, table 8 shows the project rankings for RBCBS for all projects A through
H using PSAF and using the appropriate hurdle rates (PSAFCK and PSAFWT) for check
and wire transfer projects.  Two things stand out in table 8.  First, if we cannot do all
positive NPV projects – due to funding, regulatory or political constraints – the use of
PSAF causes overinvestment in the riskier projects at the expense of the higher economic
value added projects.  Second, using PSAF as the hurdle rate would have resulted in
RBCBS undertaking at least one negative NPV project (from tables 6 and 7 we know that
A, F, and E have negative NPVs).12
Table 8: RBCBS Project Rankings
Average Hurdle Rate Correct Hurdle Rate
Project Type Project Type
F Wire Transfer D Check
G Wire Transfer C Check
H Wire Transfer B Check
C Check H Wire Transfer
D Check G Wire Transfer
B Check A Check
A Check F Wire Transfer
E Wire Transfer E Wire Transfer
Implications for Cost Recovery
As noted earlier, under current regulatory interpretation of the MCA 1980,
RBCBS are required to recover their operating costs and normal private return on capital.
The use of the average cost of capital (or the proxy thereof) for all service lines can
distort pricing decisions by the product lines.  Assume as in section II that the RBCBS
has two distinct product lines (check and wire transfer) over which it must allocate $5
million in capital.  In addition, assume that the check service accounts for 80 percent of
total RBCBS operating costs and that the Reserve Banks evenly allocate capital on the
basis of operating costs.  Finally, assume that the hurdle rates for check and wire transfer
are PSAFCK = 0.1 and PSAFWT = 0.15 (which gives a weighted-average cost of capital
and PSAF of 0.11). Table 9 shows the expected earnings, E(Y)*, that wire transfer and
check must earn to return PSAF given the capital allocation, K.
Table 9: Using Average Cost of Capital
Service PSAF E(Y)* K
Wire Transfer 0.011 11000 1,000,000
Check 0.011 44000 4,000,000
Table 10 shows the required expected earnings that check and wire transfer would need
to produce if the true hurdle rates (PSAFCK and PSAFWT) for each product line are used.13
  Table 10: Cost of Capital by Service Line
Service PSAFXX E(Y)* K
Wire Transfer 0.015 15000 1,000,000
Check 0.010 40000 4,000,000
A comparison of tables 9 and 10 shows the following.  First, the total earnings needed to
cover the cost of capital at the corporate level is $5500 in both tables.  Second, the
average return on capital for RBCBS is unchanged by the use of PSAF or the product line
hurdle rates. Finally, the failure to use the appropriate hurdle rate rates for each service
line results in a cross subsidy of wire transfer by check to the tune of $4000 (or 4 percent
return on capital).
IV.  Where Do We Go From Here?
The analysis in this paper illustrates how a failure to account for differences in
risk across correspondent banking service lines leads to distortions in investment and
pricing decisions.  These distortions result in the loss of economic value arising from
suboptimal investment decisions and a cross subsidy from low risk product lines to high
risk ones.  Our examples show that such distortions would arise even when the PSAF –
the proxy for the average cost of capital – is computed correctly.  Moreover, a PSAF that
is a poor measure of the required private rate of return on correspondent banking services
will likely increase any social welfare losses associated with current RBCBS capital
allocation and pricing rules.
Fundamental PSAF reform requires future work in two areas.  First, there is a
need to assess the risks of current and proposed services to arrive at an economic capital
allocation rule.  Second, there is a need to arrive at a defensible and economically sound
method for computing PSAF. Construction of a better proxy for the private return on
capital associated with correspondent banking services is critical – irrespective of
whether a single hurdle rate (with risk-based capital allocations) or multiple hurdle rate
approach to capital budgeting and product pricing is employed.  Moreover, the
inadequacy of the current approach and hence, the need for fundamental reforms has been14
accentuated by the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 and the new Basel
Capital Accords of 2001.15
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